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INTRODUCTION
Drug overdose deaths are rising at an alarming rate. 1 In 2016
alone, 63,632 people died from a drug overdose in the United States. 2
In 2017, drug overdose deaths grew to an estimated 72,000.3 And yet,
these statistics just scratch the surface; the United States government
does not track death rates for every drug. 4 In March 2018, the National
Institute on Drug Abuse declared the misuse of and addiction to
 J.D. candidate, May 2019, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; University of Missouri, B.A. Political Science and B.A. Political
Communications, May 2016.
1 Emerging Trends and Alerts, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, (July
2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. Opioids are the main driver of drug overdose deaths. Opioid Data
Analysis and Resources, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
(February 9, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/index.html. Every day,
more than 115 people in the United States die after overdosing on opioids. Id.
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opioids a national crisis. 5 The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention estimated that the total “economic burden” of prescription
opioid abuse alone is $78.5 billion a year, which includes the cost of
healthcare, lost productivity, addiction treatment and criminal justice
involvement. 6
On May 10, 2017, then United States Attorney General Jeff
Sessions sent a memorandum to all federal prosecutors notifying them
of a change in Department of Justice charging and sentencing policy. 7
He instructed prosecutors to charge and pursue the most serious,
readily provable offense, which, by his definition, “are those that carry
the most substantial guidelines sentence, including mandatory
minimum sentences.”8 With this memorandum came the
understanding that President Donald Trump’s administration would be
tough on crime and committed to ending the drug crisis. 9 To further
this goal, federal prosecutors began looking to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines for support—in particular, the “death results”
sentencing enhancement. 10
The “death results” sentencing enhancement is derived from the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. 11
The Act criminalizes manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or
possessing with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a

5

Emerging Trends and Alerts, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, (July
2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis.
The Midwestern region saw opioid overdoses increase 70 percent from July 2016
through September 2017. Id.
6 Id.
7 Jeff Sessions, Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 10, 2017)
(Memorandum for all federal prosecutors) (on file with the Office of the Attorney
General).
8 Id.
9 Stephen Collinson and Laura Jarrett, Trump Embraces Law and Order
Agenda, CNN, (August 29, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/29/politics/trumplaw-order-jeff-sessions/index.html.
10 Id.
11 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
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controlled substance. 12 The “death results” enhancement may be
applied when the defendant commits a drug offense and “death or
serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance.” 13 Should
the Government prove the dealer’s drugs were the but-for cause of a
drug user’s death, the dealer’s mandatory minimum sentence is twenty
years in prison.14 This is a significant increase from the penalty for
simple drug distribution.15
In United States v. Harden, the Eastern District of Wisconsin
imposed the “death results” enhancement in a case involving a heroin
overdose.16 The defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute
heroin and was sentenced to life in prison. 17 The defendant appealed
his conviction and sentence to the Seventh Circuit, which heard, as a
matter of first impression, arguments as to whether the “death results”
enhancement requires the Government prove the user’s death was
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. 18 The Seventh Circuit held
the “death results” enhancement does not require the Government
prove any mens rea element, including reasonable foreseeability.19
Therefore, the “death results” enhancement shall be treated as a matter
of strict liability.20 This holding has significant policy implications;
12

Id.
Id.
14 Id.
15 The penalties for simple drug distribution vary based on the quantity and
type of drug; however, sentences can reach as low as five years. 18 U.S.C.A. §
841(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
16 893 F.3d 434, 439 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, No. 18-6036, 2018 WL
4509897 (Oct. 15, 2018).
17 Id. at 445.
18 Id. at 446. The court’s standard of review was de novo. Id.
19 Id. at 454. The Seventh Circuit also held: (1) the evidence was sufficient to
establish that heroin distributed by the defendant was the but-for cause of death; (2)
the defendant had waived his challenge to a jury instruction regarding causation; (3)
the exclusion of testimony about an alternative heroin source was proper; (4) the
defendant was not entitled to a mistrial even though a photograph not admitted into
evidence was given to the jury; and (5) the prosecutor’s alleged misstatements did
not warrant new trial. Id. at 434.
20 Id. at 448.
13
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courts have expressed hope that drug distributers and manufacturers
will think twice about dealing drugs that are dangerous to drug users
because the dealer will be responsible for the user’s death. 21
While the Seventh Circuit reached the right decision in Harden,
federal courts are taking two very different approaches to handling two
similar fact patterns. Courts require the Government prove
foreseeability in drug conspiracy cases where a defendant is sentenced
based on a co-conspirator’s conduct; however, the Government is not
required to prove foreseeability when seeking the sentencing
enhancement for a defendant charged with simple drug distribution. 22
This discrepancy is one of many, leading some district courts to
express a desire for discretion—a way to “opt out” of the mandatory
minimum sentence even if the “death results” enhancement applies. 23
Although the Government should not be required to prove an overdose
death was reasonably foreseeable to a defendant to apply the “death
results” sentencing enhancement, a district court should be able to
depart from the mandatory minimum sentence when the sentence can
be considered a miscarriage of justice.
This Comment has four parts. Part I analyzes how courts have
historically interpreted the “death results” enhancement, including the
decision to require but-for causation and beyond a reasonable doubt as
the burden of proof. Part II considers how similar fact patterns result
in drastically different sentences, warranting some judicial discretion.
Part III dives deeper into how the Seventh Circuit reached its holding
in Harden. Finally, in Part IV, I consider the implications of Harden:
how recent cases have used Harden as precedent, why the Supreme
Court should hear a case like Harden, and how the “death results”
enhancement will affect the opioid crisis.

21

United States v. Alvarado, 816 F.3d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 2016).
United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2013), rehearing en
banc denied (Aug. 23, 2013).
23 United States v. Krieger, 628 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 2010).
22
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IS FAVORABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT
Case law regarding statutory interpretation of the “death results”
enhancement overwhelmingly benefits the Government. The
Government should not be required to prove a user’s death was
reasonably foreseeable to a defendant in order for the court to impose
the “death results” enhancement because the statutory provision’s
plain language demonstrates Congress’s intent to require but-for
cause, rather than proximate cause. Still, since courts consider the
“death results” enhancement to be an element of the offense, the
Government faces a higher burden in proving the “death results”
enhancement than it would if treated as a sentencing factor.
A. The Government should not be required to prove foreseeability
because the “death results” sentencing enhancement requires but-for
causation rather than proximate causation.
The Controlled Substances Act, as originally enacted, “tied the
penalties for drug offenses to both the type of drug and the quantity
involved, with no provision for mandatory minimum sentences.” 24
This changed in 1986, when Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act, which redefined offense categories, increased the maximum
penalties, and set minimum penalties for offenders. 25 The Act also
created the “death results” enhancement. 26 With the enhancement, the
default sentencing rules do not apply when “death or serious bodily
injury results from the use of the distributed substance.” 27 The
defendant is instead sentenced to a term of imprisonment which shall
24

Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 208 (2014).
Id. The provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841 are often referred to as the “Len Bias
laws” and are named after a popular college basketball star who died of a drug
overdose in 1986. Congress enacted the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841 under the
theory that but for their purchase of drugs, the overdose victims would not have died.
Katherine Daniels and Carol M. Bast, Difficulties in Investigating and Prosecuting
Heroin Overdose Cases, 41 CRIM. LAW. LAW BULLETIN 5 (2005).
26 Burrage, 571 U.S. at 209.
27 Id.
25
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not be less than twenty years or more than life, a substantial fine, or
both.28
Because the “death results” enhancement increases the minimum
and maximum sentence, the elements of the enhancement have to be
submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. 29 The
Supreme Court, in Burrage v. United States, considered what evidence
the Government had to present in order to meet its burden. 30
Specifically, the Court assessed whether the Government met its
burden when the evidence suggested the use of a drug, supplied by the
defendant, contributed to, but was not the but-for cause of, the victim’s
death.31 There the defendant distributed heroin to an individual who
died of a drug overdose. 32 The defendant was charged with unlawfully
distributing heroin and that “death resulted from the use of that
substance—thus subjecting [the defendant] to a 20-year mandatory
minimum sentence” pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1).33 At trial,
medical experts testified that the user may have died even if he did not
inject the heroin. 34 The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal,
arguing the Government must show the defendant’s heroin was the
proximate cause of the user’s death. 35 Proximate cause is defined in
this context as “a cause of death that played a substantial part in
bringing about the death . . . meaning the death must have been either
a direct result of or a reasonably probable consequence of the cause
and except for the cause the death would not have occurred.” 36 The
district court denied the motion and instructed the jury that the
Government only had to prove the heroin was a contributing cause of
28

Id. Notably, the “substantial” fines range from $1 million to $50 million,
depending on the drug. 18 U.S.C. § 841(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
29 Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013).
30 571 U.S. 204, 208 (2014).
31 Id. at 205.
32 Id. at 204.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 206.
35 Id. at 207.
36 Id. at 208.
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the victim’s death.37 After the defendant was convicted, the court was
required to apply the sentencing enhancement. 38 The Eighth Circuit
found the district court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion
for a judgment of acquittal. 39 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and ultimately reaffirmed that “when a crime requires not merely
conduct but also a specified result of conduct, a defendant generally
may not be convicted unless his conduct is both (1) the actual cause,
and (2) the “legal cause (often called the “proximate cause”) of the
result.”40 However, Congress may abrogate this principle by “speaking
directly to the question.”41 The Court interpreted the phrase “results
from” in § 841(b) as requiring but-for causation—that the death would
not have occurred but for the defendant’s drug dealing—rather than
proximate causation.42 Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the
district court’s decision.43
Proximate cause is not easily defined; “it is a flexible concept.”44
To say one event proximately caused another is a way of making two
separate but related assertions. 45 First, it means “the former event
caused the latter.”46 This is known as actual cause or cause in fact. 47
Events have many causes; however, only some of them are

37

Id. at 207.
Id. at 208.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 210.
41 Id. at 216.
42
Id. at 208.
43 Id. The Government expressed concerns that the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the “death results” enhancement would “unduly limit criminal
responsibility”. However, the Court disagreed, stating “we doubt that the
requirement of but-for causation for this incremental punishment will prove a policy
disaster.” Id. at 216-17.
44 Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 444 (2014) (quoting Bridge v.
Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 533 U.S. 639, 654 (2008)).
45 Paroline, 572 U.S. at 444.
46 Id.
47 Id.
38
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proximate.48 To say that one event was a proximate cause of another
means “it was not just any cause, but one with a sufficient connection
to the result.”49 Proximate cause is often explained in terms of
foreseeability.50 A requirement of proximate cause precludes liability
in situations where “the causal link between conduct and the result is
so attenuated that the consequence is more aptly described as mere
fortuity.”51 The Supreme Court has “found a proximate-cause
requirement built into a statute that did not expressly impose one.” 52
In United States v. Alvardo, the Fourth Circuit considered
whether Congress intended for § 841(b)(1) to include proximate
cause.53 In Alvardo, the defendant was convicted of knowingly and
intentionally distributing heroin, resulting in death. 54 On appeal, the
defendant argued that the district court failed to instruct the jury that
he must have “reasonably foreseen” that death could result.55 The
district court gave the following jury instruction:
If you find that the Government has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or
intentionally distributed a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of heroin on or about
March 29, 2011, you must then determine whether the
Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
death resulted from the use of such substance. 56
The defendant relied on Staples v. United States, where the
Supreme Court held “offenses that require no mens rea generally are
48

Id.
Id.
50 Id. at 445.
51 Id. (quoting Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 838-39 (1996)).
52 Paroline, 572 U.S. at 446.
53 816 F.3d 242, 244 (4th Cir. 2016).
54 Id. at 246.
55 Id. at 244.
56 Id. at 246.
49
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disfavored.”57 The court broke § 841(b)(1)(C) down into two
elements: (1) knowing or intentional distribution and (2) death caused
by the use of that drug. 58 The court found the first element, knowing or
intentional distribution of heroin, included mens rea.59 The
defendant’s reliance on Staples was misplaced however, because the
court found Staples did not require every element of an offense to have
a mens rea.60 Instead, Staples directed courts to “think twice before
concluding that an offense, viewed as a whole, contains no mens rea
requirement.”61 Therefore, § 841(b)(1)(C) did not support having a
separate mens rea, but rather served to elevate the crime of knowingly
or intentionally distributing heroin to a more serious level. 62 The
absence of a separate mens rea meant but-for cause was appropriate. 63
The Tenth Circuit has also held that the “death results”
enhancement only requires proof of but-for causation.64 In United
States v. Burkholder, a district court declined to instruct the jury that
the Government was required to prove an individual’s death was a
reasonably foreseeable result of the charged drug distribution. 65 The
defendant was subsequently convicted. 66 On appeal, the defendant
argued that § 841(b)(1) required proof that the substance he distributed
proximately caused the user’s death: that the death was a reasonably
foreseeable result of his distribution. 67 The defendant was a recovering
addict and he was prescribed an opioid as part of his treatment. 68 At
the time he was prescribed the drug, the defendant signed an
57

Id. at 249 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994)).
Alvardo, 816 F.3d at 250.
59
Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 816 F.3d 607, 609 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied (2017).
65 Id. at 610.
66 Id. at 609.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 610.
58
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agreement with his doctor to not “sell, share or give any [amount] to
another person.”69 The defendant was informed that taking the drug
with other drugs, including alcohol, could be dangerous. 70 Still, the
defendant gave one of his pills to a friend, who ultimately ingested the
pill and died as a result. 71 The Tenth Circuit reached its holding after
declaring the case an issue of statutory interpretation, inquiring
whether the “death results” enhancement requires proof of proximate
cause.72 Like its sister circuits, the Tenth Circuit looked to the plain
language of § 841(b)(1), specifically Congress’s choice of the words
“death ... results from the use of such substance.”73 In addition to the
plain language, the court focused on the context in which the language
was used and surveyed other federal statutes, identifying “numerous
instances in which Congress explicitly included proximate-cause
language in statutory penalty enhancements.”74 The court agreed with
the defendant that proximate cause “inject[s] a foreseeability element
into a statute”; however, it found Congress intended to omit a
proximate cause requirement for the “death results” enhancement.75
Therefore, the district court did not err in rejecting the defendant’s jury
instruction.76
69

Id.
Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 611.
73 Id. at 614. (emphasis in original). See United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d
945, 948 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Beyond that minimum causation . . . it is not clear what
‘results from’ might mean.”).
74 Burkholder, 816 F.3d at 615. See also Camacho v. L.C. Ward, No. 15-CV
388-JDP, 2016 WL 10679358, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 12, 2016) (Petitioner argued
that the district court violated Burrage by unconstitutionally applying a sentencing
enhancement by “considering the victim’s death a ‘foreseeable’ event of the
petitioner and his associates’ joint criminal activity.” However, the Western District
of Wisconsin determined the “foreseeability” element was unrelated to Burrage, and
the petitioner did not identify any other statutory interpretation case that would
retroactively apply to the issue).
75 Burkholder, 816 F.3d at 613.
76 Id. at 621. Unlike the majority, the dissent was not convinced that the
70
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B. Treating the enhancement as an element of the offense, rather than
as a sentencing factor, heightens the burden of proof, benefitting the
defense.
The higher the burden of proof, the more and stronger evidence
the Government must present to meet its burden. In United States v.
Booker, the Supreme Court held Federal Sentencing Guidelines are
subject to jury trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment. 77 For
instance, in Booker, the defendant was convicted in the Western
District of Wisconsin of possession with intent to distribute at least 40
grams of cocaine base. 78 Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the
defendant faced a sentence of 210 to 262 months in prison.79 At the
sentencing hearing, the judge found additional facts by a
preponderance of the evidence, which resulted in a mandatory
sentence between 360 months and life. 80 The judge treated the
additional facts as sentencing factors, ultimately imposing a thirty-year
sentence.81 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held the defendant’s
sentence conflicted with Apprendi v. New Jersey, which held a fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable

“results from” language of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) “unambiguously reveals
Congress’s intent to ‘forgo a proximate-cause requirement’ and impose strict
liability on criminal defendants.” Burkholder, 816 F.3d at 621 (Briscoe, J.,
dissenting). The dissent expressed its concern that the majority’s holding was
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Id. See also United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978) (holding “strict-liability criminal offenses
are generally disfavored and . . . far more than the simple omission of the appropriate
phrase from the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent
requirement.”).
77 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005).
78 Id. at 227.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 221.
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doubt.82 The “statutory maximum” identified in Apprendi referred to
the maximum sentence a judge could impose based “solely on the
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant.”83
The Seventh Circuit applies the Supreme Court’s analysis to each
element of the “death results” enhancement, requiring a jury to find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed a drug
offense and death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the
drug. In United States v. Lawler, the defendant was convicted of
distributing heroin and conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to
distribute.84 The case went to the Supreme Court, which affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded in light of Alleyne v. United
States.85 The defendant’s sentence was reduced, but he again appealed
to the Seventh Circuit, challenging his sentence.86 The defendant was
charged with thirty other defendants in a single-count indictment
alleging a large-scale heroin distribution conspiracy, which
contributed to five overdose deaths.87 The defendant was considered a
“low-level member of the conspiracy.” 88 While the indictment, to
which the defendant pled guilty, did reference the overdoses, the
Government did not prove that any particular defendant was
responsible for any particular death. 89 Relying on Alleyne, the Seventh
Circuit held that an element of the “death results” enhancement should
be treated as part of the offense, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.90
82

Id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
83 Booker, 543 U.S. at 221.
84 818 F.3d 281, 282 (7th Cir. 2016).
85 Id. (citing Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013) (holding facts
that increase a mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to the jury and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt)).
86 Lawler, 818 F.3d at 282.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 283.
90 Id. at 284.
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“Beyond a reasonable doubt” is a significantly higher burden of
proof than “preponderance of the evidence”; a higher burden favors
the defense.91 By treating the sentencing enhancement as an element
of the offense, rather than as a sentencing factor, the defendant can
rely on the Government’s failure to meet its burden as a defense to the
imposition of a sentence. The higher burden therefore offsets the fact
that the Government is not required to prove proximate cause, tipping
the scales from being largely in the Government’s favor to a more
balanced analysis.
THE NEED FOR DISCRETIONARY DEPARTURE STEMS FROM SENTENCING
DISPARITIES FOR CASES WITH SIMILAR FACT PATTERNS
There are cases where the “death results” enhancement clearly
should apply, whether or not death was foreseeable. However, there
are also cases where a twenty-year sentence would be a miscarriage of
justice. In addition, the fact that foreseeability is crucial to sentencing
in drug conspiracy cases, yet not required for simple drug distribution,
results in significant sentencing discrepancies between similar fact
patterns.
A. Cases where the “death results” enhancement should apply,
whether or not death was foreseeable.
Whether a sentence is a miscarriage of justice should be
determined by separating unlawful conduct from otherwise innocent
conduct.92 In Prevatte v. Merlak, the petitioner was convicted for
detonating a pipe bomb that destroyed property and resulted in the
death of an innocent bystander. 93 If the pipe bomb had not caused a
death, the maximum sentence the petitioner could have received was

91

Id.
United States v. McDuffy, 890 F.3d 796, 799-800 (2018) (citing Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994)).
93 865 F.3d 894, 895 (2017).
92
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ten years.94 However, because the judge found that the bomb did cause
the victim’s death, the petitioner was sentenced to forty-four years’
imprisonment on that count. 95 The petitioner filed a writ for habeas
corpus relief claiming that under Burrage, the jury, and not the judge,
should have made the finding that the bomb was the but-for cause of
the victim’s death. 96 The district court dismissed the petitioner’s claim
for lack of jurisdiction and he appealed. 97 The Seventh Circuit agreed
that the petition should be dismissed, but also found the evidence as to
causation was unrebutted at trial. Thus, the petitioner’s enhanced
sentence was neither illegal nor a miscarriage of justice. 98
In United States v. McDuffy, the defendant, charged with bank
robbery, moved for the district court to recognize a specific intent
mens rea requirement after the court sought to impose a “death
results” enhancement.99 The district court denied this request. 100 The
defendant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for a
bank robbery resulting in death. 101 Similar to the “death results”
enhancement for drug offenses, a defendant faces a mandatory
minimum sentence if death results from a bank robbery. 102 Here, the
Ninth Circuit held the only mens rea requirement for the sentencing
enhancement was the mens rea necessary to commit the underlying
bank robbery.103 Therefore, in McDuffy’s case, the enhancement
applied even if the death was an accident. 104 Similar to § 841(b)(1)(C),
this statutory provision 105 did not contain an explicit mens rea
94

Id.
Id.
96
Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 890 F.3d 796, 798 (2018).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 800.
104 Id.
105 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
95
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requirement.106 Still, the defendant urged the district court to read the
requirement into the statute. 107 The Ninth Circuit looked to Staples v.
United States and determined courts must read a mens rea requirement
into a statute only when it “is necessary to separate wrongful conduct
from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’” 108 In addition, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned, “it is unusual to impose criminal punishment for the
consequences of purely accidental conduct. 109 But it is not unusual to
punish individuals for the unintended consequences of their unlawful
acts.”110
When the defendant is responsible for directly distributing drugs
that result in death, there is little question that the “death results”
enhancement does and should apply. 111 Courts have been less
confident in their decision to apply the “death results” enhancement to
defendants higher up in the drug distribution chain because
foreseeability of a specific user’s death appears less and less likely. 112
B. Cases where a 20-year mandatory minimum is a miscarriage of
justice.
Sometimes, the defendant is not the cliché: not the typical “bad
guy” you see in movies. Sometimes, the defendant and the drug-user
had a positive, healthy relationship; they were friends or married. In
the midst of grieving, these defendants are forced to face the reality
that life as they know it is about to change—they face decades in
prison. In Krieger v. United States, the defendant was convicted for
106

McDuffy, 890 F.3d at 801.
Id.
108 Id. at 799-800 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994)).
109 McDuffy, 890 F.3d at 799-800.
110 Id.; United States v. Easter, 553 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding the
Government, in a drug conspiracy case, did not have to prove the defendant intended
to create a substantial risk of harm, warranting a higher sentence, when the defendant
reached for his gun during flight).
111 United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 836 (7th Cir. 2013), rehearing en
banc denied (Aug. 23, 2013).
112 Id.
107
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distribution of fentanyl. 113 The defendant received a twenty-year
sentence because her friend died after chewing a fentanyl patch
provided by the defendant. 114 During sentencing, the defendant
objected to the manner in which the Government sought the “death
results” sentencing enhancement. 115 The Government argued it was a
sentencing factor, which must be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence, rather than an element, which must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.116 After finding by a preponderance of the evidence
that death resulted from the fentanyl, the court concluded it was
obligated to impose the mandatory minimum sentence.117 The district
court expressed “discomfort with its lack of discretion and the fact that
it appeared that [the defendant] was being sentenced for homicide
despite having been convicted only of distributing fentanyl.” 118
Notably, without the enhancement, the maximum penalty for
distributing small amounts of fentanyl would have been twenty years,
with no minimum penalty. 119 The defendant’s presentence
investigative report recommended a sentencing range of ten to sixteen
months, which is significantly shorter than the twenty-year mandatory
minimum imposed by the “death results” enhancement. 120
Between the time of the defendant’s sentencing and appeal, the
Supreme Court issued several decisions that touched on the issues
Krieger raised.121 In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that facts that
113

842 F.3d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 2016).
Id.
115 Id.
116
Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 495.
119 Id.
120 Id. (“The average length of incarceration for defendants convicted under 21
U.S.C. § 841 for distribution of fentanyl where death has not resulted was seven
months”). Id.
121 Id. at 496. In collateral review, the Seventh Circuit heard arguments as to
whether the Government had sufficient evidence to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that “death resulted”. The district court was persuaded that the
Government proved this element by a preponderance of the evidence, but believed
114
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increase a mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to the jury
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 122 Therefore, if the defendant
in Krieger were to be sentenced post-Alleyne, she could not receive the
“death results” enhancement unless the indictment charged, and the
jury found beyond a reasonable doubt, that the fentanyl caused her
friend’s death.123 Then, in Burrage, the Court held a defendant cannot
receive the “death results” enhancement unless the drug the defendant
distributed was a but-for cause of death.124
In evaluating the Krieger appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted the
“murkiness of causation”. 125 It went on to apply the Supreme Court
decisions in Alleyne and Burrage, determining the Government was
required to show that the fentanyl patch, which Krieger provided, was
the but-for cause of her friend’s death.126 Krieger’s sentence was
thereafter vacated and remanded to the district court for
resentencing.127 The district court judge expressed his discomfort with
imposing a twenty year sentence, stating the sentence was “one of the
most difficult decisions [he has] had to make, and it’s a decision that
[he did] not agree with . . . in [his] opinion, 20 years [wa]s too
harsh.”128
Another area of concern is ineffective assistance of counsel. The
imposition of a twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence is unjust if
the defendant’s defense attorney does not effectively challenge its
application or hold the Government to its burden. For example, in
Gaylord v. United States, the defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to
distribute and distribution of oxycodone. 129 A drug user ingested pills
the Government could not have proven “death resulted” beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Krieger, 628 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 2010).
122 Krieger, 842 F.3d at 496.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 501.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 505.
128 Krieger, 628 F.3d at 862.
129 829 F.3d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 2016).
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distributed by the defendant, as well as cocaine from another source,
and died.130 The defendant was sentenced to twenty years based on the
“death results” enhancement. 131 The defendant later brought a 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion132 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence,
arguing that as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the “death
results” enhancement was inappropriately applied to his case. 133
Specifically, the defense attorney did not contend that the Government
failed to prove the oxycodone was the but-for cause of the drug user’s
death.134 Approximately two years after the defendant was sentenced,
the Supreme Court held that but-for causation must be shown for the
“death results” enhancement to apply. 135 In this defendant’s case, there
was no evidence that the oxycodone the defendant distributed was the
but-for cause of death. 136 As a result, the Seventh Circuit vacated the
district court’s judgment and remanded the case for an evidentiary
hearing on the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.137
Another area of concern is when a drug user intends to overdose
because a drug user’s intentions are irrelevant in an analysis of the
drug dealer’s liability. In Perrone v. United States, the defendant
moved to alter or vacate his sentence for unlawful drug distribution,
challenging the district court’s application of the “death results”

130

Id.
Id.
132 This motion is filed when the defendant believes his or her sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or when the
defendant believes his or her sentence is more than the maximum penalty authorized
by law. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-231).
133 Gaylord, 829 F.3d at 504.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 507.
137 Id. at 509. See Linder v. Kreuger, No. 1:15-CV-01055-SLD, 2017 WL
1102740, at *4 (C.D. Ill. March 23, 2017) (“Misapplication of the law raising a
statutory minimum either from zero to twenty years . . . would constitute a
‘miscarriage of justice’ sufficient to warrant relief via habeas corpus.”).
131
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sentencing enhancement. 138 In Perrone, the victim died after the
defendant injected her with 7.5 grams of cocaine, part of a suicide pact
gone wrong.139 The defendant pled guilty to a single count of unlawful
drug distribution and stipulated that his distribution caused the
victim’s death.140 On appeal, he claimed that if he knew the
enhancement required the Government to show his cocaine was the
but-for cause of the user’s death, he would have sought to withdraw
his plea.141 The day before the defendant was sentenced, the Seventh
Circuit decided United States v. Hatfield, which held the “death
results” enhancement requires the Government prove the ingestion of
the defendant’s drugs was a but-for cause of the death. 142 The Seventh
Circuit also looked to Davis v. United States, which held that “when a
subsequent statutory interpretation narrows the elements of a crime,
revealing that the petitioner has been convicted and sentenced for ‘an
act that the law does not make criminal,’ the petitioner has suffered ‘a
complete miscarriage of justice,’ that justifies relief under § 2255.” 143
The Seventh Circuit concluded the defendant asserted a cognizable
claim under § 2255; however, the evidence before the court did not
suggest the defendant’s sentence was increased by the application of
an enhancement of which he was “actually innocent”.144 Therefore, he
was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims. 145
Like the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Perrone, the Ninth Circuit
has ruled a defendant can be held responsible for a death that is an
unforeseeable suicide. In United States v. Houston, the Ninth Circuit
held: (1) the government need not prove it was foreseeable that the
138

899 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 900.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 901.
142 Id. at 902 (citing United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 948 (7th Cir.
2010)).
143Perrone, 899 F.3d at 904 (citing Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 34647 (1974)).
144 Perrone, 899 F.3d at 904.
145 Id.
139
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recipient of methadone might suffer death or serious bodily injury in
order for the court to impose the “death results” enhancement; and (2)
the district court’s error in instructing the jury that proximate cause
was necessary to impose the sentencing enhancement was harmless. 146
On appeal, the defendant argued she was being held responsible for a
death that was an unforeseeable suicide. 147 Essentially, the defendant
advocated for proximate cause. The user was found dead in her home
with numerous controlled substances in her blood and urine. 148 The
defendant’s name was on a prescription bottle found at the scene. 149
The Ninth Circuit determined that there were some crimes where
proving proximate cause was unnecessary because foreseeability was
“implicit in the common understanding of the crime.”150 These crimes
include, but are not limited to, involuntary manslaughter, conspiracy to
assault, and drug conspiracy. 151 However, this understanding did not
apply to the charge at issue: drug distribution. 152 Despite
acknowledging the inconsistent decision to require foreseeability in
some, but not all, drug cases, the Ninth Circuit agreed with its sister
circuits that the plain language of the “death results” enhancement did
not require proximate cause. 153 It also placed weight on the Fourth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Patterson, which observed that:
“The statute puts drug dealers and users on clear notice that their
sentences will be enhanced if people die from using the drugs they
distribute.”154 As to the defendant’s argument regarding the incorrect
jury instruction, the Ninth Circuit determined it “inured to the benefit

146

406 F.3d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1122.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 1123.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 1124 (citing United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139, 145-46 (4th Cir.
1994)).
147
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of the defendant because it placed a higher burden of proof on the
Government than [was] required by law.” 155
The application of the “death results” enhancement is not
contingent upon the quantity of drugs distributed or manufactured,
meaning the defendants receiving the enhancement are not necessarily
large-scale distributors. This dilemma appeared in United States v.
Rebmann, where the Sixth Circuit considered whether “the
Government may convert a defendant’s plea of guilty to only the
distribution of 1/1000th of an ounce of heroin into a homicide case by
asserting that the defendant’s husband died from an overdose of heroin
she sent him.”156 The Sixth Circuit concluded the district court was
correct in rejecting the Government’s motion for the “death results”
enhancement.157 Notably, its rationale was not based on causation, but
on the burden of proof.158 The court held the Government was required
to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the death of an individual, to
whom the defendant distributed heroin, was a result of the
distribution.159 The Sixth Circuit looked to the Supreme Court’s recent
ruling in Apprendi, and determined the “death results” provisions were
more than “a mere sentencing factor.” 160 Because the district court
applied the sentencing enhancement to the defendant in this case based
solely on its finding by a preponderance of the evidence that death
resulted from the crime, the Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence and
remanded the case for a determination that the death was caused by the

155

Houston, 406 F.3d at 1125.
321 F.3d 540, 541 (6th Cir. 2003). On appeal, the Government argued that
even if it was unsuccessful in bringing the mandatory-minimum through the “death
results” enhancement, it could use the fact that death resulted as the basis for an
“enhancement for relevant conduct”, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § D1.1, which can still
lead to a twenty-year sentence. The court rejected the Government’s ability to
circumvent its burden by this nature. Id. at 543.
157 Id. at 544.
158 Id. at 545.
159 Id. at 541.
160 Id.
156
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distribution of heroin beyond a reasonable doubt. 161 Thus, Rebmann
represents an occasion where a defendant was first “sentence[d] for a
homicide under the guise of a guilty plea to the distribution of a very
small quantity of drugs.”162
If one makes the argument that death is always a foreseeable
result of illegal drug distribution, then “not only would the individual
who produced the [drug] receive the twenty-year sentence, but every
person connected with the conspiracy in any way—from the lowliest
lookout on the corner to the boss—would all receive the same twentyyear penalty.”163 This result is overly broad. At the same time, strict
liability makes sure that “a kingpin who finances and controls a drug
distribution operation cannot escape liability for the ‘death resulting’
penalty simply because he never personally sold to costumers.” 164
Think of it this way: 21 U.S.C. § 841 makes it illegal to
“distribute” but not “share” heroin. 165 If two friends are physically
together when they buy and use heroin for their personal use, there is
arguably no distribution. 166 If one of the two friends dies from an
overdose, the other friend is not accountable for the death under the
plain language of § 841. 167 However, the Government could prosecute

161

Id.
Id. at 545; McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88 (1986) (holding it is
doubtful that Congress would have intended such a steep sentencing enhancement to
be contingent on judicial fact-finding); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 554
(2002) (holding a fact that steeply alters the defendant’s punishment is “not usually
associated with sentencing factors.”).
163 United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 837 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom. Lawler v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2287, 189 L. Ed. 2d
169 (2014).
164 Walker, 721 F.3d at 839.
165 Katherine Daniels and Carol M. Bast, Difficulties in Investigating and
Prosecuting Heroin Overdose Cases, 41 CRIM. LAW. LAW BULLETIN 5 (2005).
166 Id.
167 Id.
162
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the person who sold them the drugs and then the court would be
required to apply the “death results” enhancement. 168
C. The Government may be required to prove foreseeability when a
sentencing enhancement is applied in drug conspiracy cases. This
application is inconsistent with simple drug distribution cases.
Foreseeability is heavily litigated in the context of drug
conspiracy sentencing; however, courts have found these arguments
have no place in their analysis for simple distribution cases. The
Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Patterson, refused to analogize case
law from drug conspiracy cases, in which the defendants contested
application of the “death results” enhancement, to simple distribution
cases because in simple distribution cases the court is only concerned
with the individual defendant’s conduct. 169 In Patterson, the
defendants had hoped to apply the foreseeability requirement to their
simple distribution case. 170 The defendants pled guilty to unlawful
distribution of morphine sulfate and meperidine, which resulted in an
individual’s death, and to aiding and abetting that offense. 171 The
Fourth Circuit held the evidence supported the “death results”
sentencing enhancement. 172 A defendant brought controlled substances
to a party and traded several pills in exchange for a tattoo. 173 At some
point in the night, the host of the party discussed her intentions to take
drugs.174 The defendant subsequently left to obtain syringes from his
home.175 Upon his return, the host told the defendant that another
168

Id. There is also a risk that a sentencing enhancement constitutes a
constructive amendment of the indictment when the court instructs the jury on the
death results provision without such offense being set forth in the indictment. United
States v. Whitfield, 695 F.3d 288, 309 (4th Cir. 2012).
169 38 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir. 1994).
170 Id.
171 Id. at 142.
172 Id. at 145.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
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guest was giving the host the defendant’s pills all night.176 Still, the
defendant, host and others injected morphine, which the defendant
melted down.177 When the friends woke up the next morning, they
found the host dead. 178 The facts of this case supported simple
distribution, not a conspiracy, and established that the defendant’s
actions directly contributed to the host’s death.179 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit refused to analogize a foreseeability requirement in drug
conspiracy cases to simple distribution cases, making the defendant’s
case law irrelevant. 180
The Third Circuit’s analysis in United States v. Robinson parallels
the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Harden. At the defendant’s
sentencing hearing, the district court found that “based on their
previous drug dealings, it was reasonably foreseeable to [the]
defendant that [a co-conspirator] would deliver drugs to others.”181
The court also found: 1) the delivery of the heroin by the coconspirator to drug users was in furtherance of a conspiracy in which
the defendant was a member; and 2) the delivery was reasonably
foreseeable to the defendant in connection with the criminal activity he
agreed to undertake. 182 The Third Circuit looked to the Fourth
Circuit’s holding in United States v. Patterson, which relied on the
plain language of § 841(b)(1) to determine the enhancement has no
reasonable foreseeability of death requirement.183 The Third Circuit
agreed that the court should give effect to Congress’s intent. 184
Therefore, because Congress’ language was plain and unambiguous,
the court applied the statute as written. 185 The record was clear; it was
176

Id.
Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 145-6.
181 167 F.3d 824, 828 (3d Cir. 1999).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 830 (citing United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1994)).
184 Robinson, 167 F.3d at 830.
185 Id. at 830-31.
177
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reasonably foreseeable that the defendant’s co-conspirator would
distribute the drugs to a third-party.186 This was not only reasonably
foreseeable, but “it was the very purpose of the conspiracy.” 187 Thus,
the defendant was subject to the minimum twenty-year sentence. 188
The First Circuit, in United States v. Soler, emphasized that the
charge and the nature of the defendant’s conduct within a conspiracy
shapes whether the Government has to prove death was reasonably
foreseeable to a particular defendant.189 In Soler, the defendant argued
the “death results” enhancement was inapplicable because the key
event leading to the death—the drug user snorting heroin under the
misimpression that it was cocaine—was not reasonably foreseeable,
and that the death itself could not be foreseeable.190 Like in Robinson,
the First Circuit placed weight on the fact that the statute did not speak
to the defendant’s state of mind, which undercut the defendant’s
argument that the court should impose a foreseeability test. 191 While
the defendant cited several cases that imposed a reasonable
foreseeability requirement, those cases involved liability of one coconspirator for the acts of others.192 In contrast, “When a defendant’s
own conduct has caused the harm, those cases are inapposite” and
strict liability applies.193 Therefore, because the defendant was not
charged in a drug conspiracy, and in turn, did not argue that he was
being sentenced based on a co-conspirator’s conduct, conspiracy case
law supporting the foreseeability of death requirement was inapposite.
186

Id. at 831.
Id.
188 Id. at 832. The defendant cited U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(3), which the court
determined was consistent with its result. The section includes as relevant conduct a
“jointly undertaken criminal activity . . . whether charged as a conspiracy, all
reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity.” Id.
189 275 F.3d 146, 152 (1st Cir. 2002).
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
187
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Even when courts do comment on whether a drug user’s death
was reasonably foreseeable to a particular defendant, the question
before the court is whether the distribution of drugs was foreseeable,
not whether the death was foreseeable. In United States v. Swiney, two
members of a heroin conspiracy appealed the application of the
mandatory minimum sentence to their convictions. 194 The Government
filed a cross-appeal, arguing that all of the defendants should have
received at least twenty years because death resulted from the use of
heroin that was distributed by members of their conspiracy. 195 The
district court found no proof linking these defendants to the death,
using a “critical proximate cause inquiry.”196 On appeal, the
Government argued that all of the defendants should be held
accountable for the death under the Pinkerton theory of vicarious
liability.197 The Sixth Circuit rejected the Government’s theory of
accountability “because the scope of conduct for which a defendant
can be held accountable under the Sentencing Guidelines is narrower
than the conduct encompassed by conspiracy law.” 198 The court
concluded, “In the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a
criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the
defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a
conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred
during the commission of the offense of conviction” shall be
considered during sentencing pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
1B1.3(a)(1)(B).199 Thus, before any of the defendants in Swiney could
be subject to the sentence enhancement of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), the
district court had to find that he or she was part of the distribution
chain that led to a user’s death and that a conspiracy member’s
distribution of heroin was “reasonably foreseeable” to other members
194

203 F.3d 397, 399 (6th Cir. 2000).
Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946)).
198 Swiney, 203 F.3d at 399.
199 Id. at 402 (emphasis added).
195
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of the conspiracy, as defined in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).200 The
foreseeability requirement, while required for the sentencing
enhancement, was still connected to the drug distribution rather than
foreseeability of death. 201
The defendant in United States v. McIntosh argued the Eighth
Circuit should apply the reasoning in Swiney to his case.202 The court
refused, finding Swiney is only applicable to cases where a conspiracy
defendant played no direct part in manufacturing the drug or in
immediately distributing the drug that caused the death or serious
bodily injury.203 Instead, the court quoted the Third Circuit’s holding
in United States v. Robinson, which stated “the risk is inherent in
distributing [a controlled substance] and thus, [Congress] provided
that persons who distribute it do so at their peril.” 204 McIntosh was
therefore subject to the enhancement based on his direct role in
manufacturing the drug ingested by the user. 205
In 2013, the Seventh Circuit heard as a matter of first impression
arguments as to whether a district court has to make specific factual
findings determining whether each defendant’s conduct was part of the
distribution chain that caused a user’s death. 206 United States v. Walker
concerned the overdose deaths of five individuals who died after using
heroin distributed by a large-scale drug trafficking organization. 207
200

Id. at 406.
Id.
202 236 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 2001).
203 Id. See United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 567 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The
question whether the actions of others were reasonably foreseeable to the particular
defendants . . . is a factual one. Those facts will exist in some hub-and-spokes style
conspiracies, especially when the culpability of individuals near the hub is at stake.
They are the people who can predict what their counterparts are doing, even if they
have no direct knowledge”).
204 McIntosh, 236 F.3d at 972 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d
824, 831 (3rd Cir. 1999)).
205 McIntosh, 236 F.3d at 974.
206 United States v. Walker, 721 F.3d 828, 831 (7th Cir. 2013), rehearing en
banc denied (Aug. 23, 2013).
207 Id.
201
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The defendants in Walker pled guilty to possession with intent to
distribute and conspiracy to distribute heroin. 208 The district court
interpreted § 841 as requiring a twenty-year mandatory minimum
sentence for all members of the conspiracy because the drug
organization as a whole caused the deaths of several customers,
essentially concluding the defendants should be held strictly liable. 209
On appeal, the defendants argued this was an error, and the Seventh
Circuit agreed, holding “a defendant can only be subject to the
enhancement if the distribution of heroin that ultimately led to a
victim’s death was ‘reasonably foreseeable.’”210 There is unanimity
across the circuits that a defendant involved in a drug conspiracy
should only be sentenced for conduct foreseeable to him—the trouble
is, defendants like Donald Harden believe the result of their conduct
should also have to be foreseeable in order for the sentencing
enhancement to apply.
UNITED STATES V. HARDEN WAS CORRECTLY DECIDED
In the morning of September 5, 2014, Fred Schnettler was found
dead in his bedroom at his parents’ home. 211 Upon arrival, officers
observed a needle and spoon on the floor. 212 Donald Harden was later
charged with distributing the heroin that resulted in Schnettler’s
death.213 At trial, the Government argued Schnettler purchased 0.1
208

Id.
Id. at 833.
210 Id. at 835; United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (in a
matter of first impression, the D.C. Circuit held district courts must make an
individualized finding as to quantity of drugs foreseeable to an individual defendant
before applying a mandatory minimum sentence). See also United States v. Haines,
803 F.3d 713, 741 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding a defendant may be subject to a
mandatory minimum sentence based on the quantity of drugs he distributed as well
as the quantity distributed conspiracy-wide if the quantity was reasonably
foreseeable).
211 United States v. Harden, 893 F.3d 434, 439 (7th Cir. 2018).
212 Id.
213 Id.
209
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grams of heroin from Kyle Peterson the night before he died. 214
Peterson testified that he purchased the heroin from Brandi KniebesLarsen, who in turn testified she received the heroin from Harden. 215
The Government presented a timeline to establish that Harden’s heroin
reached Schnettler between 7:30 p.m. and 8 p.m. on September 4,
2014.216 The Government argued Schnettler overdosed on the heroin
shortly after 10 p.m.; the defense presented a conflicting timeline. 217
Kniebes-Larsen, who testified as a cooperating witness, provided
crucial testimony regarding whether Harden was aware of the quality,
and danger of, the heroin he distributed. 218 On direct-examination,
Kniebes-Larsen testified that when she purchased the heroin, Harden
told her she “needed to be very careful because apparently there were
bodies on this heroin.”219
Furthermore, at the end of the trial, the jury received two special
verdict questions: (1) whether the United States has established,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Frederick Schnettler died as a result of
the use of a controlled substance; and (2) whether the conspiracy
involved 100 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing
heroin.220 With respect to the first special verdict question, the jury
instruction said:

214

Id. at 440-41.
Id. at 442-43
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. While the credibility of witnesses is important to every criminal
prosecution, it is especially taxing in cases involving drug overdose deaths because
the key witnesses tend to either be addicts themselves or have prior convictions.
Katherine Daniels and Carol M. Bast, Difficulties in Investigating and Prosecuting
Heroin Overdose Cases, 41 CRIM. LAW. LAW BULLETIN 5 (2005). In Harden, the
court found that Kniebes-Larsen was credible and ultimately relied on her testimony
to suggest Schnettler’s death was foreseeable to Harden, despite Kniebes-Larsen
being a heroin addict. Harden, 893 F.3d at 443-44.
220 Id.
215
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The United States does not have the burden of
establishing that the defendant intended that death
resulted from the distribution or the use of the
controlled substance. Nor does the United States have
the burden of establishing that the defendant knew, or
should have known, that death would result from the
distribution of the controlled substance by the
defendant.221
The jury convicted Harden of conspiracy to distribute 100 grams
or more of heroin, resulting in death, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) and 846.222 The court applied the “death
results” enhancement, and Harden was sentenced to life in prison. 223
The sentencing enhancement required that the Government prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Harden conspired to distribute 100
grams or more of heroin; and (2) death or serious bodily injury
resulted from the use of the heroin. 224 On appeal, Harden did not
dispute that the Government presented sufficient evidence to prove the
first element.225 However, Harden did contest the sufficiency of the
evidence as to the second element. 226 Harden’s sufficiency claim
221

Id. (emphasis added). At the end of Harden’s trial, the district court judge
inquired into whether either party had any objections to the jury instructions or the
verdict forms. Id. On the Government’s recommendation, the court adjusted the
verdict form to tie the death of Mr. Schnettler to Harden. Id. The form read as
follows: “Did the death of Frederick Schnettler result from the use of heroin
provided by the Defendant, Donald S. Harden?” Id. Aside from this adjustment,
neither party requested any additional instructions. Id. Thus, Harden waived any
challenge regarding jury instructions, including his later argument that the jury
should have been instructed regarding foreseeability. Id. at 450.
222 Id. at 445.
223 Id.
224 Id. The second element is derived from Burrage’s holding that the “death
results” enhancement of § 841 is an element that must be submitted to the jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
225 Id. at 446.
226 Id.
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hinged on his interpretation of the “death results” language. 227 Harden
argued the “death results” language requires proximate-cause.228 This
would require the Government show Schnettler’s death was a
reasonably foreseeable result of Harden’s drug dealing. 229 Every other
circuit that has addressed this issue has held the “death results”
enhancement does not require proximate cause, and therefore the
government need not prove foreseeability. 230
However, Harden argued that principles of co-conspirator liability
compel a proximate cause requirement in this context.231 Harden relied
on Pinkerton v. United States, where the Supreme Court held a
defendant may only be found liable for a co-conspirator’s criminal act
if it was reasonably foreseeable. 232 The Seventh Circuit refused to
apply this reasoning to Harden’s case because Harden did not claim he
was sentenced based on a co-conspirator’s unforeseeable criminal
act.233 Instead, he argued that the “consequence of his own criminal
act—Schnettler’s death—was not reasonably foreseeable.” 234 Thus,
the issue presented did not implicate Pinkerton’s limitations. 235

227

Id. at 446-47.
Id. at 447.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 447-48; United States v. Burkholder, 816 F.3d 607, 618 (10th Cir.
2016); United States v. Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250 (11th Cir. 2011); United States
v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 137 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Houston, 406
F.3d 1121, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Carbajal, 290 F.3d 277, 284 (5h
Cir. 2002); United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Patterson, 38
F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir. 1994).
231 United States v. Harden, 893 F.3d 434, 449 (7th Cir. 2018). “Even the
Government believed it bore that burden, alleging in the indictment that Schnettler’s
death resulted from the use of heroin distributed by Harden and his co-conspirators,
that was reasonably foreseeable to him.” Appellant’s Br. 28 (Oct. 19, 2017).
232 Harden, 893 F.3d at 449.
233 Id.
234 Id. (emphasis in original). On appeal, defense counsel argued that
“Schnettler’s death, which allegedly resulted from his taking 0.1 grams of heroin that
another user described as ‘junk’, occurred after the heroin passed four links down the
228
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The Seventh Circuit also looked to the statutory language of the
enhancement, which does not require proof of proximate cause.236 The
sentencing enhancement is triggered if “death or serious bodily injury
results from the use of such substance.”237 The use of the phrase
“results from” is noteworthy because “resulting in death and causing
death are not equivalents.”238 The Seventh Circuit identified numerous
instances where Congress explicitly included the proximate cause
language in sentencing enhancements. 239 The court found that if
Congress wanted to require proximate cause it would have explicitly
done so.240 The court also considered the policy implications of its
decision.241 “Due to the extremely hazardous nature of drug
distribution, a policy of strict liability when death occurs fits the
statutory language and its evident purpose.” 242 By treating the
enhancement as a matter of strict liability, the courts are de facto
categorizing the death as foreseeable, regardless of whether a
particular defendant foresaw or should have foreseen such a result. 243
POST-HARDEN: HOW THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION WILL MAKE A
LASTING IMPACT
Defendants appealing their sentences to the Seventh Circuit have
begun citing Harden hoping the court will impose a foreseeability

causal chain from Harden was not reasonably foreseeable.” Appellant’s Br. 23 (Oct.
19, 2017).
235 Id.
236 Id. at 448.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
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requirement for the resulting death. 244 At the same time, district courts
are relying on the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Harden to justify
why the Government need not prove foreseeability. 245 While statutory
interpretation explains outright why Harden was correctly decided, the
Supreme Court should consider hearing a case where the application
of the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence is not easily
rationalized. The occasional discomfort of district court judges, when
imposing the “death results” enhancement without the option of
exercising discretion, will likely result in a Supreme Court opinion
suggesting a need for legislative reform. This is the only way district
court judges will be able to depart from this mandatory minimum
sentence.246 Clarity across the board will encourage prosecutors to ask
for the sentencing enhancement, which will have a positive impact on
the opioid crisis.
For example, in United States v. Shanks, the defendant relied on
Harden to argue the “death results” enhancement could not apply
because the death was not reasonably foreseeable. 247 In Shanks, the
defendant was charged with a variety of drug related offenses,
including conspiracy to distribute and possessing with intent to
distribute controlled substances, as well as knowingly distributing
controlled substances, resulting in the deaths of two individuals, and
serious bodily harm of another, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(C).248 The defendant moved for an in camera inspection of
psychological treatment records of one of the victims.249 He argued the
records may contain exculpatory evidence, including evidence the
victim died as a result of suicide, which he contended would release
244

See United States v. Shanks, No. 18-CR-18, 2018 WL 3439639, at *1 (E.D.
Wis. July 17, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-CR-0018, 2018
WL 4011569 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 22, 2018).
245 Id.
246 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are enacted and amended by Congress.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. Congress has the constitutional power to make laws. Id. The
Supreme Court may only interpret them. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
247 No. 18-CR-18, 2018 WL 3439639, at *1.
248 Id.
249 Id.
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him of any liability for the user’s death.250 The Government argued
that the “death results” enhancement is a strict liability offense.251 The
district court found it was unclear how the user’s psychological
records were material to his cause of death. 252 Even if the user was
suicidal at the time of his death, and the defendant could show the user
intentionally took the drugs to commit suicide, that would not negate
the but-for causation requirement. 253 As to the defendant’s argument
that the records would show the user’s death was unforeseeable, the
court held “reasonable foreseeability is not required for the ‘death
results’ enhancement.254 Stated differently, once the Government
shows the ‘but for’ causal connection between the drug and the
resulting death, criminal liability attaches without the need to prove
foreseeability.”255 The court looked to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in
Harden and concluded “strict liability creates an incentive for a drug
dealer to warn his customer about the strength of a particular batch of
drugs being sold and to refuse to supply drugs to a particularly
vulnerable people.”256
The Seventh Circuit continues to recognize that strict liability has
limits when applied to the “death results” enhancement. For example,
on a conspiracy charge, “it is not sufficient for the Government to
prove that a defendant participated in an overall conspiracy in which a
drug user died.”257 The Government must prove a particular defendant
responsible for a particular death. 258 Essentially, the Government
“need not prove that the death was reasonably foreseeable for the
‘death results’ enhancement to apply in a case where a defendant
directly distributes drugs or uses intermediaries to distribute drugs that
250

Id. at *2.
Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at *3.
255 Id.
256 Id. (quoting United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir. 2010)).
257 Shanks, 2018 WL 3439639, at *3.
258 Id.
251
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result in death.259 However, in a conspiracy [case], the Government
must prove that the defendant’s relevant conduct encompasses the
drugs linked to the death.”260 In Shanks, the defendant was not only
charged as part of a conspiracy, but he also faced a substantive count
of knowingly distributing drugs to the decedent.261 Therefore, the
foreseeability requirement in the context of conspiracy need not apply,
and the elements of the “death results” sentencing enhancement were
proven on the basis of the substantive count. 262
Recently, the Third Circuit has gone so far as to allow a jury
instruction on proximate cause in a case involving a “death resulted”
sentencing enhancement. In United States v. Gonzalez, the defendants
were convicted of conspiracy to commit interstate stalking and
cyberstalking, resulting in death. 263 The defendants appealed to the
Third Circuit, challenging the district court’s “death resulted”
instruction, which was supplied to the jury to determine whether the
defendants qualified for the sentencing enhancement. 264 The
Government argued that under the instructions there were two theories
of liability: (1) the death resulted from the defendants’ personal
actions if the defendant’s actions were the actual and proximate cause
of the individual’s death; or (2) the defendants were responsible for
the death under co-conspirator liability. 265 The district court permitted
the proximate cause theory, observing that its instruction held the jury
to a higher standard than the law required.266 The court thought of it as
a “necessary safeguard for the defendants’ rights”. 267 Thus, on appeal,
the Third Circuit determined that the district court did not err because
the “actual cause” part of the instruction tracked but-for causation, and
259

Id.
Id.
261 Id. at *1.
262 Id. at *3.
263 905 F.3d 165, 174 (3d Cir. 2018).
264 Id. at 179.
265 Id. at 188.
266 Id. at 190.
267 Id. at 188.
260
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the “proximate cause” part of the instruction provided an even more
stringent finding than required. 268
A. The Supreme Court should consider whether a discretionary
departure is appropriate for the “death results” enhancement.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines permit downward departures
“from the prescribed sentencing range in cases in which the judge
finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should
result in a sentence different from that described.” 269 Still, departures
are not available in every case, and “in fact are unavailable in
most.”270 There is no case law to support the idea that 18 U.S.C. §
3553 permits a judge to sentence below the mandatory minimum in
the “death results” enhancement. In fact, court opinions where judges
express their desire for discretion suggest the contrary. The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines are set forth by Congress.271 Because it is
unlikely that members of Congress will advocate on behalf of this
discretionary departure, since it could be framed as convicted
criminals serving less time, the Supreme Court will have to lead the
charge. If the Supreme Court were to take issue with the district
court’s lack of discretion, it can critique potential due process
violations all it wants, but it must ultimately call for the legislature to
amend § 841.
Congress’ goal in passing the Sentencing Act was to move the
sentencing system in the direction of increased uniformity. 272
Uniformity “does not consist simply of similar sentences for those
convicted of violations of the same statute . . . It consists, more
importantly, of similar relationships between sentences and real
268

Id. at 189.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-233).
270 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 221 (2005).
271 Id. at 253.
272 Id.
269
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conduct, relationships that Congress’ sentencing statutes helped to
advance.”273
Granting a district court judge discretion in a downward departure
will not inhibit narcotics prosecutions and may in fact improve the
opioid crisis. Courts will still be bound by the mandatory minimum
sentence if death results from drug distribution or manufacturing.
Prosecutors will not have to prove the death was foreseeable. A
defendant whose case teeters on the line between accidental and
criminal conduct will have an avenue to request relief. A defendant
whose case warrants a twenty-year sentence will get one. A defendant
whose case does not can be directed to addiction programs or assist
law enforcement in pursuing his or her supplier. There is “growing and
wholly justified” concern about the “proliferation and variety of drug
crimes”, but perhaps the best way to reduce these crimes is to not feel
settled in the status quo. 274

273
274

Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 235.
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